Empirically Informed Philosophy of Mind online Seminar

The starting point of this talk is that a belief–desire theory of emotion becomes plausible when it is informed by appraisal theories of emotion (a.k.a. “evaluation theories”, such as Klaus Scherer’s or Agnes Moors’) and by notions of belief grounded in cognitive science (e.g., Eric Mandelbaum’s). The central question is whether such a theory can be extended beyond emotions to other affective states. I argue that it can account for most mood episodes, a wide range of pleasures and displeasures, and many affective dispositions. However, some basic affective states arising from so-called “intrinsic pleasantness appraisal” (in Scherer’s framework) or “stimulus–response evaluation” (in Moors’ framework) fall outside the scope of a belief–desire theory, which therefore can explain most, but not all, affective states.