Empirically Informed Philosophy of Mind online Seminar

Nous aurons le plaisir d'écouter : James Grayot, Instituto de Filosofia, Universidade do Porto

Titre : "How do embodied and extended minds internalize content?"

Résumé : This paper addresses the problem of how embodied and extended minds internalize external representations and the implications for human cognition. Standard accounts, such as the thesis of neural reuse, hold that cortical networks are repurposed to manage novel representational content. While this view has garnered wide support, it inherits difficulties from traditional representational theories of cognition and leaves unresolved the question of whether neural systems represent at all. Moderate theories of extended and embodied cognition, such as Clark’s extended functionalism and Menary’s cognitive integration, better capture the transformative role of external symbols and practices but each raise ontological challenges concerning the relation between internal and external representational processes. To move forward, I evaluate two alternatives: (1) framing internalization in terms of symbolic affordances, which deny the need for internal representations but risk neglecting key (internal) features of cognitive transformation, and (2) construing internalization through inner speech, which supports cognitive transformation but risks separating representational content from the vehicles upon which complex cognitive achievements depend. I argue for a synthesis of these approaches, offering a dynamic, process-based conception of representation that transcends traditional representationalist models, but differs from radical, anti-representationalist accounts by allowing for the possibility of truly internalized content.

Online via Zoom

For any questions, please contact:
Sacha Behrend 
Elodie Boissard