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Séminaire
Séminaire général
La première séance du séminaire général de l'IHPST se tiendra lundi 2 octobre 2023 de 11h00 à 12h30 (attention au nouvel horaire), en salle de conférences de l'IHPST. Cette séance est co-organisée avec l'équipe HIPHIMO de l'Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne. Nous aurons le plaisir d’écouter Javier Cumpa de l'Université Complutense de Madrid.
"The Possibility of neo-Sellarsian Metaphysics"
What kind of metaphysics do we need? This is the crux of contemporary metaontology. In the literature, we find a rich variety of approaches related to different aims: the neo-Aristotelian approach and the search for categories (Lowe 2006), the neo-Wittgensteinian approach and the investigation of reality (Fine 2009), the neo-Carnapian approach and the question about existence (Thomasson 2015), and the neo-Quinean approach (Sider 2012) and the inquiry into structure, among others. Recently I have updated this list by introducing an approach, the neo-Sellarsian approach (Cumpa 2023), whose aim is to understand the manifest and the scientific images of the world, and their relationships. In this talk, I will critically examine Thomasson’s arguments (2007: 137-147) against the need of doing this kind of metaphysics, which are intended to reject both the substance and the possibility of this naturalistic approach to metaphysics. First, I will present the main problems Thomasson sees in her criticisms of the approach. Second, I will present solutions to fix them in order to show that the approach is substantial and possible. Finally, I will defend the need of doing neo-Sellarsian metaphysics.
What kind of metaphysics do we need? This is the crux of contemporary metaontology. In the literature, we find a rich variety of approaches related to different aims: the neo-Aristotelian approach and the search for categories (Lowe 2006), the neo-Wittgensteinian approach and the investigation of reality (Fine 2009), the neo-Carnapian approach and the question about existence (Thomasson 2015), and the neo-Quinean approach (Sider 2012) and the inquiry into structure, among others. Recently I have updated this list by introducing an approach, the neo-Sellarsian approach (Cumpa 2023), whose aim is to understand the manifest and the scientific images of the world, and their relationships. In this talk, I will critically examine Thomasson’s arguments (2007: 137-147) against the need of doing this kind of metaphysics, which are intended to reject both the substance and the possibility of this naturalistic approach to metaphysics. First, I will present the main problems Thomasson sees in her criticisms of the approach. Second, I will present solutions to fix them in order to show that the approach is substantial and possible. Finally, I will defend the need of doing neo-Sellarsian metaphysics.