séminaire général

Sometimes, policy-makers are ambiguity-averse: they avoid acting on policies with uncertain consequences, even when we can expect those policies will do more good than harm. Interestingly, with the rise of "Evidence Based Medicine" and "Evidence Based Policy", these attitudes are often described as aligning with "scientific" notions of certainty and rigour. However, "ambiguity aversion" in policy-making is controversial, because it involves systematically doing less good than we could. So, if there is an alignment between scientific virtues and epistemic caution, does this mean science is ill-suited to guide policy? This paper explores these topics, arguing that both science and policy are often governed by a version of "ambiguity aversion", and that this attitude is sometimes grounded in a distinctive deontological concern, to avoid doing harm. Therefore, it contributes to three debates: over the principles which should guide science-based policy; over the rationality of risk- and ambiguity- attitudes; and over the appeal and limits of "value free science".